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1 Introduction
If fines are imposed on the evaded tax, and if taxpayers’ preferences satisfy the (theoretically
and empirically plausible) assumption of decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA), then
the Expected Utility Theory (EUT) model of tax evasion predicts a negative relationship
between tax rates and evasion (Yitzhaki, 1974).1 Much empirical and experimental evidence,
however, finds a positive relationship between evasion and the tax rate (see, e.g., Bernasconi
et al., in press, and the references therein).2 Owing to its lack of empirical support, and its
counter-intuitive nature, the negative relationship between tax rates and evasion predicted
by the EUT model has sometimes been termed the “Yitzhaki paradox” or “Yitzhaki puzzle”.
Prospect Theory (PT) has become a centrepiece of behavioural economics, for it is able to
resolve many puzzles associated with EUT and provides a better fit to much empirical data
(Bruhin et al., 2010).3 Our study seeks to (re)-examine whether the insights of PT reverse
the Yitzhaki puzzle, as has been claimed in a number of recent papers (see, e.g., Bernasconi
and Zanardi, 2004; Dhami and al-Nowaihi, 2007; Trotin, 2012; Yaniv, 1999). In a recent
review article, Hashimzade et al. (2013: 16) consider some examples that cast doubt on this
claim, and conclude that prospect theory does not provide a “compelling” resolution to the
puzzle. We investigate this dichotomy: does PT reverse the Yitzhaki puzzle?
To investigate this question requires a general framework in which it is possible to vary
(i) the specification of reference income – to understand the role of a dependency on the
marginal tax rate and/or on the taxpayer’s income declaration; (ii) the elements of PT that
are assumed to hold – to separate out the distinct effects of reference-dependence, diminishing
sensitivity, loss aversion, and probability weighting; and (iii) the properties of the probability
of audit – when fixed exogenously and when a function of the taxpayer’s declaration. The
framework we use for this purpose – which includes PT as a special case – we term the
Reference-Dependent (RD) framework.
When the audit probability is assumed exogenous to the model, our principal contribution
is to show that the specifications of reference income in the existing literature belong to a set
for which the RD framework (which includes PT) cannot reverse the Yitzhaki puzzle. PT,
1For expositions of the EUT model, see Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Srinivasan (1973).
2The empirical evidence is not entirely consistent, however. See, e.g., Feinstein (1991) for a contrasting
finding.
3PT was initially proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), and subsequently extended to “cumulative”
PT by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). In this study we use cumulative PT, but our qualitative conclusions
apply equally to the original version of PT. See, e.g., Barberis (2013) and Camerer (2000) for reviews of
further applications of PT beyond that to tax evasion.
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as conventionally applied, does not resolve the Yitzhaki puzzle. When the audit probability
is made endogenous to the model, we show that the RD framework with homogeneous utility
– as assumed in Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007) – cannot overturn the Yitzhaki puzzle either.
We square this finding with that of Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007) – who argue that PT
unambiguously reverses the Yitzhaki puzzle – by noting that these authors augment the PT
model with an assumed “stigma” cost associated with being caught cheating. When stigma
is set to zero in their model, it no longer overturns the Yitzhaki puzzle.
A general feature of the results is sensitivity to the choice of reference level. Consistent
with Hashimzade et al. (2013), we do find sets of specifications of reference income for which
the RD framework does reverse the Yitzhaki puzzle. Interestingly, however, the literature
has not so far advanced psychologically plausible specifications of reference income that
belong to these sets. By untangling the separate elements of PT, we show the source of the
sensitivity to the reference level lies in the multiplicative interaction between endogenous
movements in the reference income and the taxpayer’s risk preferences. We also uncover
that loss aversion and probability weighting play no role in determining whether or not the
RD framework overturns the puzzle.4 Whenever the PT model does reverse the Yitzhaki
puzzle, therefore, there always exists a more parsimonious model that does so too.
We do not claim that EUT is descriptively superior or inferior to PT over the full gamete
of empirical regularities on tax related behaviour, and other evidence relating to behaviour
in risky settings more generally. Our results do, however, lead us to claim that existing
approaches to the application of PT to tax evasion fall short in respect of one of the most
significant such empirical regularities: that tax evasion is increasing in the marginal tax
rate. We conclude that, if the insights of PT can offer a plausible resolution to the Yitzhaki
puzzle, then new approaches are needed, particularly regarding the specification of reference
income.
The plan of the paper is the following. Section 2 introduces the baseline, EUT model,
which (in section 3) we contrast with the RD framework under varying assumptions regarding
the specification of reference income, audit probabilities, and the utility function. Section 4
concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
4Consistent with this finding, Eide (2001) shows that introducing (rank-dependent) probability weighting
into the standard tax evasion model changes none of the qualitative comparative statics results.
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2 The EUT model
As a springboard for our later analysis, we begin with a development of the standard EUT
model. Consider a taxpayer with an exogenous taxable income Y (which is known by the
taxpayer but not by the tax authority). The government levies a proportional income tax
at marginal rate t on declared income X. The probability of audit is given by p ∈ (0, 1).
Following Yitzhaki (1974), audited taxpayers face a fine at rate f > 1 on all undeclared tax.
The taxpayer’s expected utility may be written as
V = pv (Y c) + [1− p] v (Y n) , (1)
where Y n = Y − tX is the taxpayer’s income when not caught, Y c = Y n− tf [Y −X] is the
taxpayer’s income when caught (audited), and v is an increasing and strictly concave utility
function. The first and second order conditions for a maximum are given by
∂V
∂X
= t [p [f − 1] v′ (Y c)− [1− p] v′ (Y n)] = 0; (2)
∂2V
∂X2
= D = t2
[
p [f − 1]2 v′′ (Y c) + [1− p] v′′ (Y n)] < 0; (3)
where the latter is satisfied by the strict concavity of v. The derivative ∂X/∂t, found
implicitly from (2), is
∂X
∂t
= t
[1− p]Xv′′ (Y n)− p [f − 1] [X + [Y −X] f ] v′′ (Y c)
−D . (4)
A mode of derivation that shall prove insightful once we move to analysing variants of
the RD framework is to add and subtract t−1D [Y −X] in the numerator of (4), in which
case we obtain
∂X
∂t
=
1
t
[Y −X]− tY [p [f − 1] v
′′ (Y c)− [1− p] v′′ (Y n)]
−D , (5)
to which application of (2) yields
∂X
∂t
=
1
t
[
[Y −X]− Y [A (Y
n)− A (Y c)]
[f − 1]A (Y c) + A (Y n)
]
, (6)
where A (x) = −v′′ (x) /v′ (x) is the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion. If, as is
conventional, we assume decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA), i.e., A′ (x) < 0 – which
implies that A (Y c) > A (Y n) – equation (6) yields Yitzhaki’s (1974) puzzle: under EUT
and DARA, ∂X/∂t > 0 at an interior maximum. The Yitzhaki puzzle should be understood
as a pure income effect. An increase in the tax rate lowers expected income, which, under
DARA, makes taxpayers more risk averse. Hence taxpayers find it optimal to evade less.
3
3 Departures from the EUT model
We now depart from the EUT model. As we shall often wish to employ a stripped-down
version of PT – so as to disentangle competing effects – we first introduce variants of a
“reference-dependent” framework that each share reference-dependence as a common as-
sumption, but that allow additionally for further elements of PT.
Reference Dependence
Reference dependence can be introduced into the EUT model independently of the remaining
elements of PT. This is performed by writing the taxpayers’ objective function in (1) as:
VR = pv (Y
c −R) + [1− p] v (Y n −R) , (7)
where R is the reference level of income.5 In order to analyse various different approaches
to the setting of reference income in the literature, we will allow R to be a function of the
marginal tax only, or to be a function of both the marginal tax rate and the taxpayer’s
declaration.
Diminishing sensitivity
Diminishing sensitivity cannot meaningfully be introduced into the EUT model independ-
ently of reference dependence. In equation (7) it requires utility to be convex when its
argument is negative. For x < 0, we therefore replace v (x) with v (x), where v′′ > 0 such
that the coefficient of absolute risk aversion is A (x) < 0. As is widely noted in the literature,
under diminishing sensitivity an interior maximum must satisfy Y n − R > 0, for otherwise
the taxpayer’s objective function is globally convex.6 Moreover, if Y c − R > 0, then the
results with or without diminishing sensitivity are unchanged. Hence, when examining the
RD framework with diminishing sensitivity, we focus on the only interesting case, in which
Y n > R > Y c. In this case we can write the taxpayers’ objective function as
VDS = pv (Y
c −R) + [1− p] v (Y n −R) . (8)
The first and second derivatives of (8) with respect to X are given by
5For axiomatisations of frameworks that allow for reference dependence separately of the remaining
elements of PT see, e.g., Sugden (2003) and Apesteguia and Ballester (2009).
6We do not investigate the properties of corner solutions, for the descriptive validity of tax evasion as
an all-or-nothing activity appears weak. Note, in particular, that the focus on specifications of reference
income that are consistent with interior maxima rules out the choice of reference income as R = Y . This
specification is, however, allowable once we endogenise p in section 3.3.
4
∂VDS
∂X
= t [p [f − 1] v′ (Y c −R)− [1− p] v′ (Y n −R)] ; (9)
∂2VDS
∂X2
= t2
[
p [f − 1]2 v′′ (Y c) + [1− p] v′′ (Y n)] . (10)
The second derivative in (10) is ambiguous in sign. The condition for it to be negative
cannot be guaranteed by any easily interpretable restriction on the parameters. The second
order condition for a maximum may, therefore, not be satisfied. Moreover, under diminishing
sensitivity it is possible – because of the possibility of corner solutions – that the first and
second order conditions do not describe the solution of the maximisation problem. Local
maxima may also arise, so the first order condition may not possess a unique solution.7
As these difficulties of the PT model are well understood, we choose to set them aside
here. Henceforth, when analysing the RD framework with diminishing sensitivity, we proceed
under the maintained assumption that indeed the first order condition describes a unique,
and genuinely optimal, interior choice for the taxpayer.
Loss aversion
Loss aversion with respect to a utility function v requires that −v (−x) > v (x) for x > 0.
Note that this condition necessarily holds if v is strictly concave, hence loss aversion is
already implied by the EUT model and by the RD framework with globally concave utility.8
Loss aversion is no longer guaranteed, however, once reference dependence and diminishing
sensitivity are assumed. Under these assumptions, loss aversion holds if v (·) is assumed to
satisfy −v (−x) > v (x) for x > 0.
Probability weighting
Probability weighting can be introduced in the EUT model on its own, or in combination
with any of the remaining elements of PT. It may be introduced into either of equations (7)
or (8) by replacing p with w (p), where w (0) = 0, w (1) = 1 and w′ > 0.9
7See Hashimzade et al. (2013) for a detailed discussion of these difficulties.
8We use the original definition of loss aversion in Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Unlike this “global”
condition, Ko¨bberling and Wakker (2005) propose an alternative “local” definition of loss aversion – which
is not satisfied by the EUT model or the RD framework with concave utility – according to which v displays
loss aversion if and only if limx↑0 ∂v(x)/∂x > limx↓0 ∂v(x)/∂x.
9Hence, the objective probability distribution is (p, 1− p) and the transformed probability distribution is
(w (p) , 1−w (p)). PT allows for different weighting functions to apply to outcomes that fall above or below
the reference level. As pointed out by Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007) and Prelec (1998), however, empirically
the same weighting function is found to apply above and below the reference level, so we assume there to be
a single weighting function w.
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3.1 Reference as a function of t
We begin by considering the case in which reference income is a decreasing function of
t: Rt ≡ ∂R/∂t ≤ 0. Among the specifications of R that satisfy this assumption is the
taxpayer’s post-tax income if they do not evade (the legal post-tax income): R = Y [1− t].
This specification for reference income was first proposed by Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007)
and has subsequently been employed in Trotin (2012). Assuming reference dependence only,
the derivative ∂X/∂t (equation 6) becomes
∂X
∂t
=
1
t
[
[Y −X]− [Y +Rt] [A (Y
n −R)− A (Y c −R)]
[f − 1]A (Y c −R) + A (Y n −R)
]
. (11)
Reference dependence combined with diminishing sensitivity yields
∂X
∂t
=
1
t
[
[Y −X]− [Y +Rt] [A (Y
n −R)− A (Y c −R)]
[f − 1]A (Y c −R) + A (Y n −R)
]
, (12)
where the denominator is signed positive by the second-order condition at an interior max-
imum.10
Proposition 1 Assume Rt ≤ 0 and RX = 0. Then:
(i) assuming DARA, there exists a threshold level R˜t < −Y such that, at an interior max-
imum, ∂X/∂t < 0 for Rt < R˜t and ∂X/∂t ≥ 0 for Rt ≥ R˜t.
(ii) assuming diminishing sensitivity, there exists a threshold level R˜t,DS ∈ (−Y, 0) such that,
at an interior maximum, ∂X/∂t < 0 for Rt > R˜t,DS and ∂X/∂t ≥ 0 for Rt ≤ R˜t,DS.
(iii) parts (i) and (ii) hold if loss aversion and/or probability weighting are additionally
assumed.
In the variants of the RD framework considered in parts (i) and (ii) of Proposition 1, the
sign of ∂X/∂t is seen to switch around a threshold value. A key observation that we shall
use in our next result, however, is that in part (i) the Yitzhaki puzzle is reversed if reference
income is sufficiently sensitive to the tax rate (Rt sufficiently negative), whereas in part (ii)
the Yitzhaki puzzle is reversed if reference income is sufficiently insensitive to the tax rate
(Rt sufficiently close to zero).
The intuition for the pattern of switching observed for ∂X/∂t is straightforward once
it is noted that, when reference income is a decreasing function of the tax rate, taxpayers
10This point may be seen by substituting the first order condition in equation (9) into equation (10).
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need not feel poorer after an increase in the tax rate, for the fall in Y c and Y n is offset in
the utility function by a fall in R. In part (i), if R is less sensitive to the tax rate than is
the expected value of the tax gamble, taxpayers feel poorer (and so more risk averse) and
∂X/∂t > 0. If, however, R responds more to the tax rate than does the expected value of
the tax gamble, taxpayers feel richer (relative to the reference income) and ∂X/∂t > 0. In
part (ii) the presence of diminishing sensitivity implies that, as taxpayers feel poorer, they
become less (not more) risk averse. The chain of intuition therefore goes as follows: if R is
less sensitive to the tax rate than is the expected value of the tax gamble, the taxpayer feels
poorer (and so less risk averse) and ∂X/∂t > 0. If, however, R responds more to the tax
rate than does the expected value of the tax gamble, taxpayers feel richer relative (and so
more risk averse) and ∂X/∂t < 0. The final part of Proposition 1 clarifies that allowing for
loss aversion and probability weighting does not alter these intuitions.
We may now state a straightforward corollary of Proposition 1:
Corollary 1 (i) Assume RX = 0, and Rt ∈
(
R˜t, R˜t,DS
)
. Then, at an interior maximum,
∂X/∂t > 0 whether or not diminishing sensitivity is assumed.
(ii) Assume R = Y [1− t], which implies Rt = −Y . Then, from equations (11) and (12),
∂X/∂t = t−1[Y −X] > 0 whether or not diminishing sensitivity is assumed.
According to part (i) of Corollary 1, there is an interval of Rt such that reference income is
insufficiently sensitive to the tax rate for the RD framework without diminishing sensitivity
to resolve the Yitzhaki puzzle, but too sensitive for the RD framework with diminishing
sensitivity to resolve the Yitzhaki puzzle. Hence, in this range, whatever the form of v, the
RD framework cannot resolve the Yitzhaki puzzle. Part (ii) clarifies, for emphasis, that the
result in part (i) applies to the specification of R as the legal post-tax income – as adopted
in much of the literature. Note that, in this case, the ability of the RD framework to reverse
the Yitzhaki puzzle is strictly weaker than that of the EUT model. The latter can always
reverse the puzzle, albeit by invoking the unsatisfactory assumption of increasing absolute
risk aversion (and this must be sufficiently strong), whereas the RD framework cannot reverse
the puzzle for any choice of preferences consistent with an interior maximum.
The preceding findings have implications for some of the existing literature. First, Bernas-
coni and Zanardi (2004) reverse the Yitzhaki puzzle in a PT model. Different from the re-
maining literature, these authors do not specify the reference income, but examine taxpayer
behaviour for all possible values of R. By not specifying the reference income, these authors,
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in effect, assume that R is independent of the marginal tax rate t (and the taxpayer’s de-
claration X), which can be understood in the context of our analysis as corresponding to the
case in which Rt = 0. In this case we have Rt = 0 > R˜t,DS, which, by part (ii) of Proposition
1, implies ∂X/∂t < 0. Hence we recover Bernasconi and Zanardi’s (2004) finding (although
they use the full apparatus of PT, including loss aversion and probability weighting). In light
of our analysis, however, we note the role in this (positive) result of not specifying R. As
the authors discuss in their conclusion, the predictions of their model vary greatly with the
assumed level of reference income, so determining this parameter is unavoidable if the PT
model is to yield clear and testable predictions. We show, however, that once a particular
specification for R is adopted (even one which is psychologically plausible), the PT model
may no longer reverse the Yitzhaki puzzle.
Second, Yaniv (1999) examines a PT model with reference income specified as R = Y −D,
where D is the amount of an advance tax payment. The advance payment D is specified (up
to a constant) as D = αtb, implying Rt = −αb, where b is the tax authority’s estimate of
the taxpayer’s income (which could under- or over-estimate the true Y ), and α ∈ [0, 1]. By
Proposition 1, a necessary (and still not sufficient) condition for ∂X/∂t < 0 at an interior
maximum is that Rt > −Y , which implies αb < Y . For this condition to hold for any
α ∈ [0, 1] it must be that b < Y . Hence, the Yitzhaki puzzle is resolved in Yaniv’s model
when the tax authority under-estimates a taxpayer’s income. A difficulty with this finding is
that the empirical evidence on advanced tax payments finds that taxpayers who are under-
withheld at filing exhibit lower rates of compliance than those who are over-withheld (e.g.,
Cox and Plumley, 1988; Chang and Schultz, 1987; Robben et al., 1990), which suggests that
a revenue-maximising tax authority always over-estimates a taxpayer’s income (see, e.g.,
Elffers and Hessing, 1997). Last, in an unpublished working paper, Trotin (2012) claims
(her Proposition 8) to resolve the Yitzhaki puzzle in a PT model with reference income as
the taxpayer’s legal post-tax income. Corollary 1 shows this claim to be false.11
3.2 Reference as a function of t and X
We now turn to the case in which reference income is a function of both the marginal tax
rate and the taxpayer’s declaration. Although we know of no published application to tax
evasion that employs this specification for reference income, it is of interest for at least two
reasons. First, Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006) make a general argument, designed to be portable
11The difference in findings appears due to a non sequitur in the proof of Trotin’s Proposition 8. In
particular, we are unable to replicate the expression for ∂ΦR (x
∗, t) /∂t in the first line of the proof.
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across contexts, that the reference level should reflect the expected outcome of the lottery.
If, accordingly, reference income is set as the expected value of the tax gamble,
R = pY c + [1− p]Y n = Y − tX − pft [Y −X] , (13)
then it is a function of both X and t.12 Second, Hashimzade et al. (2013) briefly consider
an example in which R = [1− t]X, but do not draw out the more general implications of
allowing for dependency upon X. Note that both specifications of R discussed above satisfy
the following properties: (i) at an interior maximum, Rt < 0, RX < 0, RXX = 0; and (ii) RX
is homogeneous of degree one in t, such that t−1RX is independent of t.13 If, accordingly,
we endow R with these two properties then an increase in the tax rate affects the declared
income in the following way:14
∂X
∂t
=
1
t
[
[Y −X]− φ [A (Y
n −R)− A (Y c −R)]
[ft− t−RX ]A (Y c −R) + [t+RX ]A (Y n −R)
]
, (14)
or, for the case of diminishing sensitivity,
∂X
∂t
=
1
t
[
[Y −X]− φ [A (Y
n −R)− A (Y c −R)]
[ft− t−RX ]A (Y c −R) + [t+RX ]A (Y n −R)
]
, (15)
where φ = t [Y +Rt] +RX [Y −X].
Proposition 2 Assume Rt < 0, RX < 0, RXX = 0 and RX homogeneous of degree one in
t. Then parts (i)-(iii) of Proposition 1 hold unchanged, and so does its Corollary 1.
Proposition 2 is a strong result: it states that additionally allowing reference income to
depend upon X (as well as t) in the manner so far considered in the literature leaves the pre-
dictive power of the RD framework in respect of the Yitzhaki puzzle entirely unaltered. The
proof proceeds by establishing that equations (14) and (15) have identical roots to (11) and
(12). Hence, it remains the case that, for any reference level such that Rt ∈
(
R˜t, R˜t,DS
)
, the
12This specification for R guarantees that, for any X ∈ [0, Y ], the taxpayer’s income is (weakly) below
the reference level if caught (−ft [1− p] [Y −X] ≥ 0) and (weakly) above the reference level if caught
(pft [Y −X] ≥ 0 ) for any X ∈ [0, Y ]. The set of specifications of reference income that possess this property
is, therefore, somewhat larger than has hitherto been recognised in the literature (see, e.g., Proposition 3 in
Dhami and al-Nowaihi, 2007).
13To sign RX in the case in which R is the expected value of the tax gamble, we make use of the fact that
pf < 1 at an interior maximum. This is the standard condition that the tax gamble must be better than
fair.
14We write the FOC as ∂V/∂X = t
[
p
[
[f − 1]− t−1RX
]
v′ (Y c)− [1− p] [1 + t−1RX] v′ (Y n)] = 0. As
t−1RX is independent of t, we may then simply apply the steps of Section 2.
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RD framework is unable to reverse Yitzhaki’s puzzle whether or not diminishing sensitivity
is assumed. A straightforward Corollary of Proposition 2 is as follows:
Corollary 2 If R is the expected value of the gamble, or if R = [1− t]X as in Hashimzade
et al. (2013), then ∂X/∂t > 0 whether or not diminishing sensitivity is assumed.
According to Corollary 2 neither of these specifications of reference income can overturn
the Yitzhaki puzzle in any variant of the RD framework. Together, the results of sections
3.1 and 3.2 imply that the RD framework does not reverse the Yitzhaki puzzle for any of
the specifications of reference income we observe in the literature.
3.3 Endogenous Audit Probability
Suppose now that the probability of audit is not exogenous, but instead depends on declared
income.15 Consistent with the literature on optimal auditing (e.g., Reinganum and Wilde,
1986) we assume that higher income declarations are less likely to be audited (∂p/∂X ≤ 0).
The models discussed so far are for the special case of this assumption in which ∂p/∂X = 0.
Under this new assumption the analysis becomes more complex and few, if any, general
results are possible. We therefore follow Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007) who analyse a model
in which v and v are homogeneous of degree β ∈ [0, 1] – as in Tversky and Kahneman (1992)
– and in which R = [1− t]Y .16 Applying this framework in equation (8), but now assuming
p = p (X), homogeneity implies that
Vp = t
β[Y −X]β
[
1− p− p [f − 1]β
]
v(1). (16)
The first order condition corresponding to (16) is
−tβ[Y −X]β−1
[
[Y −X]
[
1 + [f − 1]β
]
p′ + β
[
1− p− p [f − 1]β
]]
v(1) = 0. (17)
From (17) we obtain:
Proposition 3 Assume endogenous reference dependence, with R = Y [1− t], v homogen-
eous of degree β, and p′ ≤ 0. Then, at an interior maximum, ∂X/∂t = 0.
15Hashimzade et al. (2013) discuss this version of the RD model only cursorily in their footnote 5.
16The homogeneous form is standard in applications of PT, and is axiomatised under PT by al-Nowaihi
et al. (2008).
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Proposition 3 clarifies that, when reference income is the legal post-tax level of income, the
RD framework with homogenous preferences makes the same prediction for the relationship
between the tax rate and evasion at an interior maximum, irrespective of whether p′ (X) = 0
or p′ (X) < 0 is assumed. In either case, Yitzhaki’s puzzle remains. Moreover, Proposition
3 holds irrespective of whether utility is assumed globally concave, or to display diminishing
sensitivity. The only distinction of note between the two cases is that, as described by
Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007), for p′ (X) = 0 the dynamics of the optimum are bang-bang.
Hence, except in the special case in which an interior solution is weakly optimal, the RD
framework is simply incapable of delivering an interior solution for X. This difficulty is,
however, mitigated when p′ (X) < 0, for the function p (X) can be chosen to make the
taxpayer’s objective function strictly concave.
How can Proposition 3 be squared with Proposition 4 of Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007),
which these authors interpret as showing that PT resolves the Yitzhaki puzzle? The answer
is that these authors allow for a feature additional to those of PT: a “stigma” cost s > 0,
such that income when caught becomes Y cs = Y
c − s [Y −X].17 Rewriting in our notation
the expression for ∂X/∂t in their equation (8.26), we obtain
∂X
∂t
= −sβθ[s+ [f − 1] t]
β−1
t[Y −X]1−β [βw (p)− [Y −X]w
′ (p) p′] , (18)
where θ is a parameter such that θ > 1 implies loss aversion in their formulation. For s > 0,
and assuming p′ < 0, equation (18) indeed yields ∂X/∂t < 0, and this result continues to
hold without the assumptions of loss aversion and probability weighting (w (p) = p, θ = 1).
When stigma is removed from the model (s = 0), however, equation (18) yields ∂X/∂t = 0,
which accords with our Proposition 3: the Yitzhaki puzzle remains.
PT is not a sufficient condition to resolve the Yitzhaki puzzle in Dhami and al-Nowaihi’s
model, but is it a necessary condition? That is, can stigma be combined with a theory of
decision-making other than PT and still reverse the Yitzhaki puzzle?
Proposition 4 Assume EUT, stigma, p′ < 0, and risk neutrality. Then, at an interior
maximum, ∂X/∂t < 0.
Proposition 4 clarifies that, once stigma is introduced into the EUT model, it too may
17See Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007) for a discussion on the empirical relevance of stigma and its use in the
tax evasion literature.
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readily reverse the Yitzhaki puzzle.18 Proposition 4 appears of roughly equal generality to
Dhami and al-Nowaihi’s Proposition 4: the latter may not hold for sufficient deviations from
the assumption of homogeneity, while the former may not hold for sufficient deviations from
risk neutrality. Overall, therefore, we find no evidence to suggest that the RD framework
systematically improves upon the predictions of the EUT model in respect of the Yitzhaki
puzzle in this case. As such, Dhami and al-Nowaihi’s (2007) result should, in our view, be
interpreted as illuminating the role of stigma in reversing the Yitzhaki puzzle – a contribution
of potential import in itself – but not as demonstrating a descriptive advantage of PT over
EUT in respect of the Yitzhaki puzzle.
Although any positive level of stigma is sufficient to overturn the Yitzhaki puzzle in the
EUT model of Proposition 4, much larger levels of stigma must be assumed to resolve a
further difficulty with the EUT model: it predicts far more tax evasion than is empirically
observed.19 By contrast – as loss aversion and probability weighting help reduce predicted
evasion levels – PT is shown by Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007) to be able to match empirically
observed levels of evasion for much more moderate levels of the parameter s. Thus, it can
be argued, the PT model should be preferred to the EUT model on these grounds.20 We
recognise this argument, but note two points. First, the validity or otherwise of this argument
is orthogonal to our analysis, which is concerned solely with the ability of models to resolve
the Yitzhaki puzzle. Second, it is equally possible to resolve the levels puzzle without resort
to either PT or stigma costs. For instance, PT assumes that taxpayers observe the true audit
probability p, which is then psychologically exaggerated (for small p) in the decision-making
process. An alternative view is that taxpayers face ambiguity over p, the value of which
they do not know for sure. Snow and Warren (2005) show that introducing ambiguity over
p into the tax evasion model decreases predicted evasion if taxpayers are ambiguity averse.
Also, Kleven et al. (2011) show that when the EUT model is extended to allow for plausible
levels of third-party reporting, the predicted level of compliance falls to levels in line with
those observed empirically. The latter explanation can be straightforwardly integrated into
the EUT and RD models we consider here, so as to make them consistent with level data,
without altering the predictions of these models concerning the Yitzhaki puzzle.
18Although we believe Proposition 4 to be new as stated, the idea that stigma can overturn the Yitzhaki
puzzle in the EUT model is not. Variations of this idea, but under different assumptions over how stigma
enters the taxpayer’s objective function, are found in, e.g., al-Nowaihi and Pyle (2000), Dell’Anno (2009),
Gordon (1989) and Kim (2003).
19See, e.g., Alm et al. (1992: footnote 3) for a detailed discussion of the levels puzzle, and al-Nowaihi and
Pyle (2000) for the levels of stigma needed to resolve it.
20We are grateful to Sanjit Dhami for this point.
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4 Conclusion
Albeit with limitations, (see, e.g., Levy and Levy, 2002; List, 2003), PT is widely viewed as
the best available description of how people behave in risky settings. Barberis (2013: 73)
notes, however, that there are “few well-known and broadly accepted applications of prospect
theory in economics.” The reason, Barberis argues, is that PT is not straightforward to apply:
in particular, the most appropriate choice of the reference level is often unclear.21
In this paper we focused on tax evasion and in particular on the Yitzhaki puzzle: the EUT
model of tax evasion predicts a decrease in tax evasion when the tax rate increases. Does
PT resolve the puzzle? We address this question in a general formulation that encompasses
different specifications of reference income and which disentangles the different elements of
PT. We find that existing applications of PT to tax compliance do not convincingly resolve
the Yitzhaki puzzle. In particular, we show that, in the widely considered version of the tax
evasion model in which audit probability is exogenous, popular specifications of reference
income imply that PT, and all variants of it encompassed within the RD framework, are
incapable of reversing the Yitzhaki puzzle. We demonstrate a similar impossibility result for
the case in which audit probability is endogenous.
Barberis’s generic point over the difficulty of proper identification of the reference level
shines through in the tax evasion context. In particular, when reference income is not spe-
cified – as in Bernasconi and Zanardi (2004) – the PT assumption of diminishing sensitivity
enables it to reverse the Yitzhaki puzzle. When, however, reference income is a decreasing
function of the tax rate – as is the case for the psychologically plausible specifications of
reference income advanced so far in the literature – PT readily fails to reverse the Yitzhaki
puzzle. In this sense, different views over the interpretation of reference income can yield
(very) different outcomes.
What do our findings suggest for the importance of the individual elements of PT? We
show in Proposition 1 that diminishing sensitivity is neither necessary nor sufficient for the
RD framework to reverse the Yitzhaki puzzle. It is not necessary as Yitzhaki’s puzzle can
be reversed by endogeneity of reference income alone, and it is not sufficient, as it does not
always reverse the puzzle. Curiously, diminishing sensitivity lies behind both the ability of
PT to reverse the Yitzhaki puzzle when reference level is not specified, and for its inability
to do so for conventional specifications of reference income.
21Existing specifications of the value and weighting functions of PT are also problematic (see, e.g., Neilson
and Stowe, 2002).
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We find that loss aversion and probability weighting are irrelevant in respect of the pre-
dictions of the RD framework for the sign of ∂X/∂t. Invoking Occam’s razor, we believe that
results relating to the Yitzhaki puzzle that have been attributed to “prospect theory” may
more properly be interpreted as being attributable to simpler reference-dependent models
that contain only a subset of the elements of PT.
We do not take our findings to imply that PT is necessarily unimportant for the tax
evasion decision. Indeed, given the range of systematic deviations from EUT that PT can
explain, it might be surprising if this were the case. The PT model does reverse the puzzle in
some well-defined situations, but, interestingly, these situations are not those that existing
applications of PT have argued to be psychologically plausible. If PT is to offer a convincing
explanation of the puzzle, new approaches will need to be considered. We see two strands of
research that might further illuminate the role of PT. The first is the further investigation
of the specification of the reference level: are there psychologically plausible specifications of
reference income that satisfy the conditions required for PT to resolve the Yitzhaki puzzle?
As reference income must be sufficiently insensitive to the tax rate for PT to reverse the
puzzle (Proposition 1) one possibility is to assume an adaptive process for R in an explicitly
dynamic framework. In this vein, Bernasconi et al. (in press) allow for reference income to
adapt over time to changes in the tax rate and show that, under these conditions, PT can
predict an upward drift in tax evasion (after an initial fall), following an increase in the tax
rate.
Alternatively, it has long been known that taxpayers do not, in the most part, treat
the evasion decision as a simple gamble (e.g., Baldry, 1986). Researchers might, therefore,
investigate whether PT adds value in combination with other plausible developments of the
standard model. For instance, Rablen (2010) introduces PT into a version of the tax evasion
model that allows for taxes to fund the provision of a public good. The author shows that
reference dependence and diminishing sensitivity are sufficient to overcome a puzzling result
that arises under expected utility: that taxpayer evasion is decreasing (increasing) in the
tax rate when the public good is over-provided (under-provided). For now, however, with
respect to applications of PT, Yitzhaki’s puzzle remains a puzzle.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
(i) We begin by establishing the existence of a point such that ∂X/∂t = 0. To do this, we
first show that ∂X/∂t > 0 when Rt = 0: in this case equation (11) becomes
∂X
∂t
=
1
t
[
[Y −X]− Y [A (Y
n −R)− A (Y c −R)]
[f − 1]A (Y c −R) + A (Y n −R)
]
> 0. (A.1)
We now show that ∂X/∂t < 0 as Rt ↓ −∞: the first order condition for X is written
as
∂VRD
∂X
= t [p [f − 1] v′ (Y c −R)− [1− p] v′ (Y n −R)] ,
which does not depend on Rt. Hence we may vary Rt in the right-side of equation (11),
holding X (and R) fixed, in which case this expression is seen to be monotonically
decreasing and unbounded below as Rt ↓ −∞. By continuity, there must therefore
exist a value R˜t < 0 such that ∂X/∂t = 0. It follows, by monotonicity, that ∂X/∂t < 0
for Rt < R˜t and ∂X/∂t ≥ 0 for Rt ≥ R˜t. From equation (11) we may also infer the
inequality R˜t = −Y + [Y −X] [f−1]A(Y c−R)+A(Y n−R)A(Y n−R)−A(Y c−R) < −Y .
(ii) Proceeding as in part (i), we now show that ∂X/∂t < 0 when Rt = 0: in this case
equation (11) becomes
∂X
∂t
=
1
t
[
[Y −X]− Y [A (Y
n −R)− A (Y c −R)]
[f − 1]A (Y c −R) + A (Y n −R)
]
, (A.2)
which can be rearranged as
∂X
∂t
=
1
t
[
[Y −X] fA (Y c −R)−X [A (Y n −R)− A (Y c −R)]
[f − 1]A (Y c −R) + A (Y n −R)
]
< 0. (A.3)
Similarly to part (i), it can be shown that – as ∂2X/ [∂t∂Rt] < 0 – it holds that
∂X/∂t > 0 as Rt ↓ −∞. There must, therefore, exist a value R˜t,DS < 0 such that
∂X/∂t = 0. By monotonicity, it follows that ∂X/∂t < 0 for all Rt > R˜t,DS, and
∂X/∂t ≥ 0 for all Rt ≤ R˜t,DS. Finally, from equation (12) we may also infer the
inequality R˜t,DS = −Y + [Y −X] [f−1]A(Y c−R)+A(Y n−R)A(Y n−R)−A(Y c−R) > −Y .
(iii) Introducing loss aversion and/or probability weighting leaves (11) and (12) symbolically
unchanged.
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Proof of Proposition 2. (i) Setting equation (14) to zero and re-arranging for Rt we
obtain R˜t = −Y + [Y −X] [f−1]A(Y c−R)+A(Y n−R)A(Y n−R)−A(Y c−R) .
(ii) Similarly, but using equation (15), we obtain R˜t,DS = −Y +[Y −X] [f−1]A(Y c−R)+A(Y n−R)A(Y n−R)−A(Y c−R) .
(iii) Introducing loss aversion and/or probability weighting leaves (14) and (15) symbolically
unchanged.
Proof of Corollary 2. If R is the expected value of the gamble then, from (13), we have
Rt = −pfY +X [pf − 1] and RX = −t [1− pf ]. Hence φ = 0, so ∂X/∂t = t−1[Y −X] > 0.
If, alternatively, R = [1− t]X then Rt = −X. We know from Proposition 2 that ∂X/∂t > 0
for any Rt > R˜t, with R˜t < −Y. We have then Rt = −X > −Y > R˜t.
Proof of Proposition 3. Equation (17), which implicitly defines X, can be rewritten as
[Y −X]
[
1 + [f − 1]β
]
p′ = −β
[
1− p− p [f − 1]β
]
. As this equality does not depend on t,
it holds that ∂X/∂t = 0.
Proof of Proposition 4. The objective function under risk neutrality (v (X) = X) is
given by V = p [Y c − s [Y −X]]+[1− p] [Y n], from which we obtain the first order condition
−p′f [Y −X] + pf − 1 = [p
′ [Y −X]− p] s
t
. (A.4)
The derivative of t with respect to X is
∂X
∂t
= −−p
′f [Y −X] + pf − 1
D
, (A.5)
where D = ∂2V/∂X2 < 0. Using (A.4) into (A.5), we obtain
∂X
∂t
= − [p
′ [Y −X]− p] s
tD
=
s
[s+ tf ]D
< 0. (A.6)
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